Polina Lyadnova

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On May 9, 2023, we wrote about Decree of the President of Russia No. 302 that created a framework for nationalization of Russian assets belonging to persons from “unfriendly” states (the “Decree”). At that time the only assets to which nationalization applied were the shares in strategic energy companies Unipro, controlled by the Government of…

On June 23, 2023, the European Union published its 11th package of sanctions in relation to Russia. In addition to adding 71 individuals and 33 entities to the list of designated persons which are subject to sanctions, the new package fine-tunes the existing regime, with extensions primarily aimed at combatting circumvention more effectively and…

On May 22, 2023, the President of Russia signed Decree No. 364 (“Decree 364”) On Certain Amendments to Decree of the President of Russia No. 430 dated July 5, 2022 (“Decree 430”) requiring Russian businesses who have issued Eurobonds to issue replacement securities to enable holders whose bonds are held through Russian depositaries to receive payments.Continue Reading Russian Obligors Are Required to Issue Russian Bonds Replacing their Eurobonds

On 19 May 2023, the UK expanded its list of Designated Persons under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 by adding 86 new persons, comprising 42 individuals and 44 Russian legal entities. The newly Designated Persons are primarily involved with, or linked to, the defense, transportation, extraction, metallurgy, financial and agricultural sectors of the Russian economy. This expansion of sanctions appears to follow the G7 Leaders’ Statement on Ukraine, which was also issued on 19 May.Continue Reading UK Russian Sanctions Expanded Following G7 Summit

On April 25, 2023, the President of Russia signed Decree No. 302 On Temporary Management of certain assets, including movable and immovable assets and equity interests in the capital of Russian legal entities, that appoints the Federal Agency for State Property Management as the temporary manager of such assets and allows the agency to exercise all the rights of the owner of such assets, other than to dispose of the assets.Continue Reading Tit for Tat Continues, or Further Russian Countersanctions That Allow Nationalization of Assets of Persons From Unfriendly States

On December 5, 2022, the maritime services ban targeting Russian-origin crude oil that previously had been announced by an international coalition of countries, including the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, took effect.  While each coalition member has enacted its own measures to give effect to the ban (as we discussed previously here[1]), the measures enacted by the coalition members are generally consistent and include the same major features, namely, a maritime services ban and associated price cap “safe harbor” or exemption.[2]  Since the effective date of the maritime services ban, Russian President Vladimir Putin has issued a decree prohibiting the supply of Russian-origin oil and oil products to certain foreign persons applying the price cap, and OFAC has issued additional guidance relating to the upcoming implementation of the maritime services ban with respect to Russian-origin petroleum products.Continue Reading Recent Developments Regarding the Maritime Services Ban on Russian-Origin Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (with Price Cap “Safe Harbor” or Exemption)

The United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom, along with a number of other jurisdictions, have responded to the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine by adopting new, additional and/or enhanced economic sanctions, trade restrictions and other restrictive measures targeting, in different ways, Russia, Belarus, and the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic, which Russia has purported to recognize as independent states.  Russia, in turn, has responded to these restrictive measures by adopting its own countermeasures and related regulations affecting, for example, certain dealings involving non-Russians in Russia.
Continue Reading Sanctions Developments Resulting From the Conflict in Ukraine

On February 10, 2022, the United Kingdom published new legislation (the “Amendment”) significantly expanding the scope of targets on which the UK government may impose sanctions relating to Russia.[1]  The Amendment, which was issued in response to the current situation in Ukraine and takes immediate effect, broadens the designation criteria of the existing Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.[2]  Whereas the existing provisions were limited to persons directly engaged in activities relating to the “destabilisation” of Ukraine,[3] the Amendment further authorizes sanctions against:

  • any “Government of Russia-affiliated entity,” defined as entities:
    • directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the Russian government;
    • in which the Russian government directly or indirectly holds a minority interest;
    • that receive or have received financing directly or indirectly from the Russian Direct Investment Fund or the National Wealth Fund; or
    • which “otherwise obtain a financial benefit or other material benefit” from the Russian government;
  • individuals or entities carrying on business of “economic significance” (which is not further defined) to the Russian government;
  • individuals or entities carrying on business in a sector of “strategic significance” to the Russian government, defined as the Russian chemicals, construction, defence, electronics, energy, extractives, financial services, information, communications and digital technology, and transport sectors; and
  • individuals or entities that directly or indirectly own or control or work as a director (whether executive or non-executive), trustee, or equivalent of any entity in the above categories.

As before, sanctions imposed under the United Kingdom’s Russia sanctions program include an asset freeze, travel ban (for individuals), prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to or for the benefit of the designated party, and prohibition on dealing with funds or economic resources of the designated party (as well as entities owned or controlled by the designated party).Continue Reading United Kingdom Broadens Scope of Potential Russian Sanctions Targets

The Court of Appeal confirmed[1] that a borrower under a Tier 2 facility agreement was excused from making payments because of the risk of U.S. secondary sanctions.

The court made it explicitly clear that whether or not non-performance may be excused will depend on the specific words of the affected contract and the wider context.  However, whilst fact sensitive, the decision also makes clear that the English court is likely to consider U.S. secondary sanctions as “mandatory” provisions of law.  
Continue Reading UK Court of Appeal Says Risk of U.S. Secondary Sanctions is a “Mandatory Provision of Law” Excusing Non-Payment

On 6 July 2020, the UK Government announced the introduction of a “Global Human Rights” sanctions regime (the “GHR Sanctions”). The regime marks the first time the UK Government has imposed sanctions measures independently from the European Union and the first time it has exercised its ability to impose sanctions directly in response to human rights violations. However, the new measures do not necessarily indicate the UK’s future policy direction, and after Brexit the UK sanctions regime will look broadly similar to that of the EU.
Continue Reading New UK Sanctions Regime Introduced