The following is part of our annual publication Selected Issues for Boards of Directors in 2025Explore all topics or download the PDF.


The second Trump Administration is expected to mark the return of a more transactional foreign policy approach, with an openness to dealmaking supported by the aggressive use (or threat) of trade controls. Boards should, therefore, expect the U.S. government to continue to rely on trade controls as a key foreign policy tool. Although specific actions remain uncertain, significant change is possible on a number of fronts, including sanctions relating to China, Russia, Iran, Syria and Venezuela.  Continue Reading Trade Controls: Recent Developments and Changes on the Horizon for 2025

On January 10, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued sweeping new sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector, including the imposition of a new petroleum services ban, expanded secondary sanctions authority, and designations of certain Russian oil producers, insurance providers, and more than 180 so-called “shadow fleet” vessels.  Until this time, U.S. sanctions specific to the Russian energy sector generally were limited to a ban on maritime services for oil and petroleum products sold at or below the relevant price caps, designations of specific projects, traders, or vessels, and certain pre-2022 targeted sectoral sanctions and secondary sanctions authorities. Continue Reading OFAC Expands Sanctions against Russian Energy Sector

The Russian financial services sector remains a key target of U.S., UK, and EU sanctions.  As discussed below, a number of recent such sanctions against Russia and countermeasures by the Russian government  have further complicated efforts for investors seeking to divest listed securities from Russia.Continue Reading Sanctions on Russian Securities Infrastructure Create Additional Hurdles to Divesting from Russia

On November 21, 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) designated additional entities operating in the Russian financial services sector, including Gazprombank Joint Stock Company (“Gazprombank”), the largest and, until November 21, most significant remaining non-sanctioned Russian bank that has served as the primary conduit for processing payments for Russian gas sold to third countries since March 2022.  Specifically, OFAC designated Gazprombank pursuant to Executive Order 14024 (“E.O. 14024”) for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy, and noted that Gazprombank had served as a “conduit for Russia to purchase military materiel,” and also was used by the Russian government to pay military personnel and their families.Continue Reading OFAC Sanctions Gazprombank, Continues to Target Russian Financial Sector and Foreign Financial Institutions

As anticipated by recent media coverage, the Governmental Commission for Control over Foreign Investments (the “Governmental Commission”) published its October 15, 2024 decision tightening conditions for exits by investors from “unfriendly” jurisdictions (i.e., those that have imposed sanctions against Russia) (the “Decision”).  Prior to the Decision, the Governmental Commission had already imposed various conditions when approving sales of equity in Russian companies by parties from “unfriendly” jurisdictions.  Such conditions were typically communicated to the applicants in the excerpts from the minutes of the Governmental Commission meetings.  The Decision lists the revised conditions that should generally be imposed by the Governmental Commission when approving such sale transactions:Continue Reading Russian Countermeasures: The Governmental Commission Tightens Conditions for Exits by Investors From Unfriendly Jurisdictions

On September 12, 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) June 12, 2024 determination entitled “Prohibition on Certain Information Technology and Software Services” entered into effect.  The determination prohibits the direct or indirect provision to Russia from the United States or by U.S. persons of (1) information technology (“IT”) consultancy and design services and (2) IT support services and cloud-based services for enterprise management software and design and manufacturing software (collectively, the “IT Services Prohibition”).  On September 16, 2024, similarly focused export controls took effect, prohibiting the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to Russia and Belarus of certain EAR99 software relating to enterprise resource planning (ERP) and other commercial functions, which were issued earlier by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) on June 12, 2024.Continue Reading U.S., UK, and EU Sanctions Alignment: U.S. IT and Software Sector Service Bans and Export Controls Take Effect as Russia Sanctions Continue to Expand

Following a long and somewhat sleepy existence on the margins of contractual interpretation case law, force majeure clauses (“FMCs”)  found themselves subject to a rude awakening with the global onset of COVID in 2020, and consequent interruptions to all manner of contracts relating to global supply chains, major sporting events, and many other facets of business. The judicial analysis of how and when FMCs are engaged in international commerce has continued post-COVID, with the introduction of wide-ranging Sanctions against Russia.Continue Reading Sanctions, Certainty and Pragmatism – the Contemporary Context for Analysing Force Majeure clauses

On May 20, 2024, President Putin signed Decree No. 430 (the “Decree”), effective the same day.  The Decree establishes restrictions on the acquisition of IP rights by Russian persons from so-called “unfriendly” jurisdictions.  The term “unfriendly” jurisdiction has been used in other countersanctions regulations and includes all foreign states that commit unfriendly acts towards the Russian Federation and Russian legal entities and natural persons (i.e., countries that have introduced sanctions against Russia, including the European Union, United Kingdom, and United States).Continue Reading New Russian Decree Imposes Restrictions on Transfer of IP Rights

On May 23, 2024, Russian Presidential Decree No. 442 (the “Decree”), which establishes the framework that will allow the Russian government to seize any U.S. assets in Russia, was signed. This comes just weeks after the U.S. Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians (REPO) Act, which authorizes the President of the United States to confiscate any sovereign assets of the Russian Federation that are in the U.S. territory, entered into force on April 24, 2024.[1]Continue Reading Potential Seizure of U.S. Assets in Russia

On April 24, 2024, President Biden signed into law H.R. 815, a foreign aid bill containing a provision that doubles the statute of limitations (SoL) for civil and criminal violations of U.S. sanctions and other national security programs from five years to ten years.Continue Reading Statute of Limitations for U.S. Sanctions Violations Extended from Five to Ten years