On July 14, President Trump issued an Executive Order pursuant to the Hong Kong Policy Act eliminating the separate status of Hong Kong and China under various provisions of U.S. law, including export controls, immigration, tax, and extradition, as well as providing for the implementation of recent Hong-Kong related sanctions authorities.

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On May 15, 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (the Interim Rule) amending the direct product rule under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to further restrict Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei) and its affiliates designated on the Entity List from receiving semiconductor and other products produced outside the United States using U.S.-origin software and technology.  The changes, which are effective immediately (but subject to two savings clauses), could have a significant impact on the ability of non-U.S. foundries that manufacture semiconductor products for Huawei and its affiliates (e.g., HiSilicon) using U.S.-origin software or technology to continue to do so (and could have a corresponding significant impact on the competitiveness of U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment and software).  BIS also extended the temporary general license (TGL) that authorizes certain activities subject to the EAR involving Huawei and its affiliates through August 13, 2020.[1]
Continue Reading BIS Expands Export Restrictions on Huawei, Extends Temporary General License

Regulation 2017/2321,[1] which introduced a new methodology for calculation of normal value[2] in trade defence cases (“New Methodology”), entered into force on December 20, 2017 (see here). Two years on, a review of the Commission’s implementation practice provides useful insight into questions of evidentiary burden, practical application, and selection of representative third country.

Continue Reading Two Years On: Implementation of the New Methodology in Anti-Dumping Cases

Over the last few weeks, the U.S. House and Senate have separately passed a number of amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (the “NDAA”) that, if enacted, would expand sanctions on persons and activities related to North Korea, China, Russia, Burma, and certain Central American states.
Continue Reading Sanctions Outlook: Congress to Consider Sanctions Provisions in FY2020 Defense Bill

China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced at a special press conference on May 31 that it will institute an “Unreliable Entity List” system based on China’s Foreign Trade Law, Anti-Monopoly Law, and National Security Law. The planned “Unreliable Entity List” will include foreign companies, organizations, and individuals that do not obey market rules, act contrary to the spirit of contract, engage in boycott or suspension of supply against Chinese enterprises without commercial justifications, or seriously harm the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises.  MOFCOM will announce the specific measures to be taken against those placed on the “Unreliable Entity List” in the near future.
Continue Reading China to Establish “Unreliable Entity List” in Response to “Unilateralism and Trade Protectionism”

In March, 2017, Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturer ZTE entered into a settlement with U.S. export control and sanctions authorities in connection with a multi-year scheme to re-export U.S.-origin telecommunications equipment to Iran and North Korea using a network of front companies.  ZTE also admitted to deliberately concealing and destroying evidence of the scheme to keep it from the U.S. government investigation.  ZTE paid a civil and criminal penalty of $1.19 billion and, as part of the settlement, represented that it would take disciplinary action against 39 employees.  ZTE entered into a criminal plea agreement and settlement agreements with BIS  and OFAC.

Continue Reading ZTE Penalized for Violation of Settlement Agreement

In parallel with the entry into force of Regulation 2017/2321 amending EU anti-dumping and subsidy rules (see here for further details), the Commission released its first country report on December 20, 2017.  Unsurprisingly, the Commission has chosen China as the subject of this first report.  In the accompanying Q&A document, the Commission stresses that this choice “merely reflects the fact that investigations and measures against China account for the largest proportion of the EU’s anti-dumping investigations and trade defense measures”.

Continue Reading First Country Report on New EU Anti-dumping Rules Released

On December 12, 2017, the European Parliament and Council signed the new regulation (EU) 2017/2321 amending the current anti-dumping methodology.  This follows the Council’s approval, with amendments, on December 4, 2017.  The final text of the regulation was published today in the Official Journal.  It will enter into force tomorrow (December 20, 2017).  (See our previous posts for further detail on the new anti-dumping methodology and the political agreement on the new methodology.)
Continue Reading EU’s New Anti-dumping Methodology Enters Into Force

On October 3, 2017, the EU Parliament, the Council, and the Commission reached an agreement on changes to the EU anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation. (See our previous posts on China’s status and the public consultation.) Concurrently, however, the 2013 Commission’s proposal on the Modernization of Trade Defense Instruments (covering inter alia amendments to the “lesser duty rule”) is still undergoing internal negotiations.

Continue Reading EU Reaches Political Agreement On New Anti-Dumping Methodology

Background

Fifteen years ago, China joined the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). To alleviate concerns of cheap Chinese goods flooding international markets at that time, China agreed to allow other WTO members to continue conducting their anti-dumping calculations in a special way, thereby recognizing the concerns of certain members that prices of Chinese goods could be distorted due to state interference. This methodology considered China as a “non-market economy” (“NME”). In a nutshell, this means other countries can disregard Chinese prices or costs, and can use “alternative methods” (external benchmarks, such as hypothetical costs of a third country) to determine the margin of dumping in an investigation. In doing so, authorities will typically end up levying higher anti-dumping duties on Chinese goods.


Continue Reading Anti-Dumping, Non-Market Economy and Chinese Goods – Where Do We Stand in the EU?