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On February 10, 2022, the United Kingdom published new legislation (the “Amendment”) significantly expanding the scope of targets on which the UK government may impose sanctions relating to Russia.[1]  The Amendment, which was issued in response to the current situation in Ukraine and takes immediate effect, broadens the designation criteria of the existing Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.[2]  Whereas the existing provisions were limited to persons directly engaged in activities relating to the “destabilisation” of Ukraine,[3] the Amendment further authorizes sanctions against:

  • any “Government of Russia-affiliated entity,” defined as entities:
    • directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the Russian government;
    • in which the Russian government directly or indirectly holds a minority interest;
    • that receive or have received financing directly or indirectly from the Russian Direct Investment Fund or the National Wealth Fund; or
    • which “otherwise obtain a financial benefit or other material benefit” from the Russian government;
  • individuals or entities carrying on business of “economic significance” (which is not further defined) to the Russian government;
  • individuals or entities carrying on business in a sector of “strategic significance” to the Russian government, defined as the Russian chemicals, construction, defence, electronics, energy, extractives, financial services, information, communications and digital technology, and transport sectors; and
  • individuals or entities that directly or indirectly own or control or work as a director (whether executive or non-executive), trustee, or equivalent of any entity in the above categories.

As before, sanctions imposed under the United Kingdom’s Russia sanctions program include an asset freeze, travel ban (for individuals), prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to or for the benefit of the designated party, and prohibition on dealing with funds or economic resources of the designated party (as well as entities owned or controlled by the designated party).Continue Reading United Kingdom Broadens Scope of Potential Russian Sanctions Targets

U.S. sanctions policy in the first year of the Biden administration saw both change and continuity. As expected, the administration sought to cooperate with allies to impose multilateral (rather than unilateral) sanctions, focused on human rights abuses and opened the door for a new nuclear deal with Iran. At the same time, the administration continued to focus on virtual currencies and on combating illicit cyber activities relating to ransomware, and clarified (and in some respects expanded) sanctions issued under the Trump administration targeting Chinese companies deemed to be part of the Chinese military-industrial complex.
Continue Reading Economic Sanctions: Developments and Considerations

On April 15, 2021, the Biden administration issued a new executive order (the New EO) creating broad authority to impose blocking sanctions against a wide range of individuals and entities determined to be engaged in “harmful foreign activities” of the Russian Federation.[1]  In parallel with and under the authority of the New EO, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a new directive (Directive 1) prohibiting U.S. financial institutions from participating in the primary market for ruble-denominated sovereign debt or from otherwise lending funds to the Russian Federation, effective June 14, 2021.[2]  (Non-ruble Russian sovereign debt and funding have been prohibited under an existing 2019 ban, described in our previous post and below.)  As part of “a new U.S. campaign against Russian malign behavior” under the New EO and existing authorities, OFAC also designated over 40 individuals and entities alleged to have attempted to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election or to be operating in the Crimea region.[3]
Continue Reading Biden Administration Imposes New Restrictions on Russian Sovereign Debt, Authorizes Additional Sanctions

Yesterday, updated guidance from the U.S. Department of State relating to Section 232 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (“CAATSA”) was published in the Federal Register.[1]  The updated guidance, which became effective on July 15, 2020, expands the potential applicability of secondary sanctions pursuant to Section 232 with respect to Nord Stream 2 and the second line of TurkStream.  Any work on or financial involvement in NordStream 2 or the second line of TurkStream will now be sanctionable, even if undertaken pursuant to an existing contract.  This could affect, among other things, lending and other financing to companies (including European companies) with any connection to either project.
Continue Reading Updated Guidance for Section 232 of CAATSA Published

Regulation 2017/2321,[1] which introduced a new methodology for calculation of normal value[2] in trade defence cases (“New Methodology”), entered into force on December 20, 2017 (see here). Two years on, a review of the Commission’s implementation practice provides useful insight into questions of evidentiary burden, practical application, and selection of representative third country.
Continue Reading Two Years On: Implementation of the New Methodology in Anti-Dumping Cases

On the evening of December 9, 2019, a U.S. congressional conference committee released the compromise version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (“NDAA 2020” or “Defense Bill”).  NDAA 2020, which will be voted upon without further amendment and is virtually certain to be enacted into law, contains provisions that would authorize new secondary sanctions relating to the Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream projects, Syria, and North Korea.
Continue Reading Compromise U.S. Defense Bill Provides for New Secondary Sanctions Against Russia, Syria, and North Korea

Late on Friday, August 2, 2019, the U.S. Administration announced that it would implement a second wave of sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) against the Russian Federation.  These sanctions will;

  • prohibit U.S. financial institutions from participating in future primary issuances of non-ruble Russian sovereign debt;
  • require the United States to oppose any new assistance to Russia by international financial institutions; and
  • prohibit the export to Russia of dual-use goods controlled for chemical or biological warfare reasons.

Continue Reading United States Imposes Limited Sovereign Debt, Multilateral Lending, and Export CBW Act Sanctions on Russia

Late in the evening of August 1, 2019, President Trump signed an executive order (the Executive Order) re-delegating implementation of certain sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) to the Secretary of the Treasury.  According to press reports, the Administration may be preparing for a second round of CBW Act sanctions against Russia as a result of the Skripal poisoning.
Continue Reading New Executive Order Hints at Additional Sanctions on Russia; Implementation to Come

Over the last few weeks, the U.S. House and Senate have separately passed a number of amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (the “NDAA”) that, if enacted, would expand sanctions on persons and activities related to North Korea, China, Russia, Burma, and certain Central American states.
Continue Reading Sanctions Outlook: Congress to Consider Sanctions Provisions in FY2020 Defense Bill