On July 12, the State Department announced that President Trump is issuing an Executive Order extending the previously announced deadline under Executive Order 13761 to complete a review of the Government of Sudan’s conduct and determine whether to permanently terminate U.S. sanctions against Sudan (see our previous update here).  In the meantime, the OFAC general license suspending sanctions against the government and territory of Sudan (31 C.F.R. § 538.540) remains in effect.  The general license authorizes all transactions with the Government of Sudan and its controlled entities, the territory of Sudan, and any Specially Designated National (SDN) in Sudan currently designated with the tag [SUDAN].  It also unblocks all property previously blocked under the Sudanese sanctions.  The license does not, however, affect other sanctions programs, and other SDNs located in Sudan but designated under different programs (including those relating to Darfur, South Sudan, and terrorism) will remain sanctioned.  Comprehensive restrictions on U.S. exports to Sudan also remain in place (see the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Sudan page).

Sudanese sanctions will now be re-evaluated by October 12, 2017.  The new Executive Order leaves in place the previous structure pursuant to which Sudanese sanctions will be permanently terminated if the Secretary of State makes a determination that the Government of Sudan has sustained the positive actions leading to the suspension of sanctions.

On July 6, 2017, the EU and Japan announced an “Agreement in Principle” on the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (“EPA”).  Negotiations on “the world’s largest, free, industrialised economic zone” began in 2013, and have now culminated in a political agreement which sets out the commitments of both Parties on numerous topics. While parts of the draft text have been published, many issues remain under negotiation. Nonetheless, the EPA provides useful guidance on what European and Japanese businesses can plausibly expect from this deal.  A summary of key issues is set out below. Continue Reading Opening Up European and Japanese Markets: What the EU-Japan Trade Deal Means for Businesses

On June 16, 2017, the President released a National Security Presidential Memorandum, which outlines the Trump Administration’s national security and economic policy towards Cuba. The Presidential Directive lays out the framework for rolling back certain Obama-era regulations that eased travel and trade restrictions between the United States and Cuba. The White House has released a fact sheet related to today’s Presidential Directive, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has released a list of frequently asked questions.

Continue Reading President Trump Announces Limited Roll-Back of Obama-Era Cuba Sanctions Relief

On June 15, 2017, the United States Senate adopted S.722, incorporating the “Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017” and the “Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017,” by a vote of 98-2. The new law, assuming it is passed by the House and adopted,  would:

  • codify all existing Russia sanctions and designations (meaning the Trump Administration cannot unilaterally lift them) and require congressional review for any subsequent changes in licensing policy;
  • tighten existing sectoral sanctions against Russian state-owned energy, financial, and defense companies and threaten their expansion to the state-owned shipping, rail, and mining/metal sectors;
  • reinvigorate existing but currently unenforced secondary sanctions targeting Russia and add new secondary sanctions provisions targeting Russian pipeline transactions in particular (but leave those sanctions in the hands of the Trump Administration); and
  • expand authority to sanction Russian cyber-related activities.

With respect to Iran, the Sanctions Bill would impose a largely symbolic expansion of secondary sanctions against Iranian military activity and sharpen focus on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliates.

The bill now proceeds to the House for consideration, the timing of which is uncertain, and it is possible that further amendments will be made. However, given the margin of passage of the Sanctions Bill and the bipartisan negotiations resulting in its adoption, it appears that there is a good chance that the final legislation passed by the House will be broadly similar and will be adopted by a margin sufficient to override any veto by President Trump.

The linked memorandum provides an overview of the key provisions of the new legislation.  Please click here to read the full alert memorandum.

Background

Fifteen years ago, China joined the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). To alleviate concerns of cheap Chinese goods flooding international markets at that time, China agreed to allow other WTO members to continue conducting their anti-dumping calculations in a special way, thereby recognizing the concerns of certain members that prices of Chinese goods could be distorted due to state interference. This methodology considered China as a “non-market economy” (“NME”). In a nutshell, this means other countries can disregard Chinese prices or costs, and can use “alternative methods” (external benchmarks, such as hypothetical costs of a third country) to determine the margin of dumping in an investigation. In doing so, authorities will typically end up levying higher anti-dumping duties on Chinese goods.

Continue Reading Anti-Dumping, Non-Market Economy and Chinese Goods – Where Do We Stand in the EU?

On May 22, 2017, the Council officially authorized the opening of Article 50 negotiations with the UK. It appointed the Commission as the EU’s negotiator and adopted a first set of Negotiating Directives outlining the EU’s priorities for the first phase of negotiations. These directives are in line with, and complement, the (more political) Article 50 Guidelines of the European Council, adopted by the EU 27 Heads of State and Government on April 29, 2017. This last step in a chain of authorization procedures means that the European Commission, led by Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier, now has all the clearances required empowering it to start Brexit talks forthwith.

Continue Reading Adoption of European Commission Mandate – Brexit Negotiations Can Now Start

On May 16, 2017, the EU Court of Justice released its long-awaited opinion on the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (“FTA” ) (“the Agreement”) (full text here). Back in July 2015, after the EU and Singapore completed trade negotiations, the European Commission sought clarity on its authority to conclude complex deals.

The following questions submitted by the Commission have now been answered:

Continue Reading ECJ Issues Opinion on Singapore FTA: Answers to Guide Brexit Trade Negotiators

It took eight years to get to this point, but the dramatic rollercoaster of Canada-EU free trade negotiations will soon start to bear fruit. On May 11, 2017, the Canadian Senate passed Bill C-30, the CETA Implementation Act. Royal Assent was received on May 16. Earlier, on February 15, 2017, the European Parliament approved the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”). This means that the path will very soon be clear for most of the agreement to be applied on a provisional basis, pending institution of relevant Canadian regulations.

Continue Reading Opening Doors to European and Canadian Companies: Imminent Provisional Application of CETA

In recent times, the EU and its trade partners have cranked up momentum on the establishment of a multilateral investment court, with the aim of replacing ad hoc arbitration provisions in investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) for the protection of investors. In our previous post, we noted that this has caused some debate in the Canada-EU trade deal, where this provision led to objections by numerous member states, as well as last minute blocking of Belgium’s approval to the trade accord.

Continue Reading Where Else for Investors to Sue? Multinational Companies Weigh in on a New Investment Court

On March 30 – 31, 2017, Cleary Gottlieb hosted a conference on The Future of Trade Defence Instruments: Global Policy Trends and Legal Challenges.  The event was jointly organized together with the University of Passau, the Europa-Institut Saarbrücken, the Institute of European and International Economic Law & the World Trade Institute – University of Berne.

Continue Reading Cleary Gottlieb Hosts Trade Defence Conference in Brussels